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Psychagogia in Plato's Phaedrus
ELIZABETH ASMIS
From ancient times, there has been much discussion whether Plato's
Phaedrus is a unified composition. The problem is that the dialogue
seems to have a variety of topics— love, beauty, the soul, rhetoric,
dialectic, and writing—and that it seems to fall into two halves, the
first comprising three speeches, the second consisting of dialectical
discussion. In favor of the unity of the dialogue, ancient and modern
scholars have argued that the various topics are closely interwoven.'
' The Neoplatonist Hermeias (5th century ad.) discussed the unity of the Phaedrus
in his commentary on the dialogue. He notes that the dialogue has been thought to
be about love, rhetoric, the soul, the good, primary beauty, and beauty of every kind.
He agrees with lamblichus that the unifying topic of the Phaedrus is "beauty of every
kind"; and he proposes that there is a gradual ascent from Lysias' love for the beauty
of Phaedrus' body to Phaedrus' love for the beauty of Lysias' logos, then to psychic
beauty, to the beauty of the cosmic gods, to intelligible beauty, and finally to Eros
and beauty itself, with a subsequent reversal back to psychic beauty and then to the
beauty of logoi (pp. 8-12 of P. Couvreur's edition, Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis
Phaedrum Scholia, Paris 1901). I agree with Werner Jaeger that the Phaedrus is unified
by the problem of rhetoric (Paideia, tr. by Gilbert Highet, vol. 3, New York 1944, p.
184). I also agree in large part with Ronald B. Levinson that unity is achieved through
a series of "dialectical transformations and reconciliations" of a number of themes,
among them love and beauty, madness, rhetoric, and philosophy ("Plato's Phaedrus
and the New Criticism," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 46 [1964], 293-309). In
a perceptive, short note Robert G. Hoerber proposes that the unity of the Phaedrus
consists in the "proper Collection and Division" of the four topics: erotic passion,
Platonic love, current rhetoric, and dialectic ("Love or Rhetoric in Plato's Phaedrus}','
Classical Bulletin 34 [ 1 958], 33). Others who have argued for the unity of the Phaedrus
are: Gustav E. Mueller, who suggests that the real theme is the question "what is
man?," in "Unity of the Phaedrus',' Classical Bulletin 33 (1957), 50-53 and 63-65;
John L Beare, "The Phaedrus: its structure; the 'EPfiS theme: notes," Hermathena
17 (1913), 312-34; W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther, "The Unity of the 'Phaedrus',"
University of California Publications in Classical Philology 14 (1952), 387-417; and Paul
Plass, "The Unity of the Phaedrus," Symbolae Osloenses 43 (1968), 7-38 (reprinted
with numerous typographical errors in Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric, ed. by Keith
V. Erickson, Amsterdam 1979).
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This approach is, I think, correct. At the same time, the dialogue
seems to me more unified than has been thought. The underlying
theme that binds the whole dialogue is, I suggest, Plato's new
definition of rhetoric as a certain ''psychagogia'' (261a, 271c). The
dialogue begins with an illustration of the wrong type of psychagogia
and moves gradually toward a revelation of the right kind of psy-
chagogia; and throughout this progression Socrates exemplifies the
right kind of psychagogia by leading the youthful Phaedrus from a
fascination with the wrong kind of rhetoric to a contemplation of
the right kind. This progression leads from Lysianic to Isocratean
rhetoric and then to genuine, philosophical rhetoric.
The term psychagogia occurs twice in the Phaedrus, both times in
the final, dialectical section of the dialogue. Socrates bases his ex-
amination of rhetoric on the definition of rhetoric as "a certain
psychagogia through words, not only in the law-courts and all other
public meetings, but also in private meetings, alike in matters small
and large, and properly no more to be esteemed in important than
in unimportant matters" (261a-b).^ Later in the discussion, Socrates
reverts to this definition by reminding Phaedrus that the function of
speech is ''psychagogia'' (271c).
This new definition of rhetoric is immediately conspicuous as a
revision of the view presented in the Gorgias. Here Gorgias describes
rhetoric as "the ability to persuade by words jurors in the law-court,
councillors in the council, assemblymen in the assembly, and anyone
in any other meeting that is political" (452e).^ In the Gorgias, rhetoric
is the practice of public persuasion. In the Phaedrus, by contrast,
Socrates views rhetoric as a means of influencing individuals, in
private or in public, on matters of individual concern.
Plato signals this shift by alluding to the Gorgias both in the
discussion that leads up to the new definition and in Phaedrus'
^ Phaedrus 261a-b: . . . xl/vxaywyia tu, dia Xoyuv, ov fiouou tV diKaarrjpiou; koi S<toi aXkoi
drifioaioi avXXoyoi, aXXa Kot iv ibiou^, r} avrr] anLKpoiv rt koi (uyaXuv iripi, koi ovSef ivTinonpov
TO yt opOov wept airovdala 77 inpl <l>avXa yiyvbp.tvov;
' Gorgias 452e: to ireidap . . . oCbv r' uvat Totq Xoyoic, kuI iv SiKaaT-qpiu) diKacTTac, koi iv
0ovXevTijpiw ^ovXevTOK; Kal tu (KKXrjaia (KKXrjaiaaTa<; koi iv aXXu) avXKbyw Travri, Saru, av
KoXiTiKOc, avXXoyoc, yiyvqrai. Cf. 454b, 455a. P. Kucharski examines in detail how the
discussion of rhetoric in the Phaedrus is an outgrowth of the discussion in the Gorgias
in "La Rhetorique dans le Gorgias et le Phedre," Reime des Etudes grecques 74 (1961),
371-406. Antje Hellwig's Untersuchungen lur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platan und
Aristoteles {Hypomnemata 38, Gottingen 1973) is also a valuable contribution to this
topic.
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response to it. Socrates begins the discussion by asking whether the
rhetorician must know the truth (259e). This question is the focus
of Socrates' entire examination of rhetoric. As a possible answer,
Socrates sums up the position taken by Gorgias in the Gorgias: that
if an aspiring rhetorician lacks knowledge, he must acquire it, but
that knowledge by itself is insufficient for persuasion {Gorgias
458e-460a, Phaedrus 260d). Socrates also reminds Phaedrus that
there are arguments purporting to show that rhetoric is not a skill,
rex^rj, but an "unskilled routine" {arexvoq rpilSi]), lacking in knowledge
(Phaedrus 260e); Socrates used such arguments in the Gorgias (463b,
501a). Then, after stating his new definition, Socrates asks Phaedrus
whether this is what he has heard; and Phaedrus expresses surprise,
saying that he has heard no more than that rhetoric concerns lawsuits
and public speaking (261b). Phaedrus' surprise is itself surprising,
since all of the rhetoric exemplified previously in the Phaedrus has
been of a conspicuously private kind. The three speeches that pre-
ceded all dealt with the intimate question of the relationship between
lover and beloved. In expressing surprise, Phaedrus stands for the
general reader who is familiar with the discussion in the Gorgias and
who is now being alerted that a new view is being proposed.
Socrates responds to Phaedrus' surprise by arguing that his defi-
nition fits common rhetorical practice. Rhetoricians, he points out,
practice an art (if indeed it is an art) of opposition {ocvTLXoyLKr]), which
aims to make the same thing appear to be both one thing (such as
just) and its opposite (such as unjust); and this aim, which consists in
making anything resemble anything at all, is not confined to public
speaking (261b-e). Consequently, Socrates argues, since rhetoric is
the practice of deception, and since deception cannot be successful
unless the deceiver knows the truth, the rhetorician must have
knowledge.
Socrates draws no attention for the time being to the term
psychagogia, the key term of his definition. This term is another new
element in the definition; Plato did not use the term in any previous
discussion of rhetoric. The reason it does not strike the attention of
Phaedrus is that it is entirely compatible with the familiar view of
rhetoric as the practice of public persuasion. The term suggests
beguilement; and by emphasizing the deceptive nature of rhetoric in
his discussion, Socrates invites the reader to understand the term in
a pejorative sense for now, as the practice of alluring and beguiling
others. Later, he will reveal the full meaning of the term and the full
novelty of his definition.
The earliest attested meaning of the compound psychagog- is that
of "conjuring" or "evoking" souls of the dead. From this use, there
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evolved the notion of influencing the souls of living people, with the
connotation of "alluring" or "beguiling" them."* Using the verbal
form, Aristophanes combines the tw^o senses and gives his own twist
to them in a portrait of Socrates in the Birds, produced in 414 B.C.
Here the chorus of birds sees a strange sight: Socrates "is conjuring
souls" {\l/vx<xy(t}yd, 1555) by a lake among the "Shadow-feet." When
the cowardly Peisander comes to this place to get back the spirit
(^pvxv) that deserted him when still alive, Socrates slays a young camel
just as Odysseus had slain sheep: and Chaerephon is drawn to the
blood from the world below. In casting Socrates as a conjurer of
souls, Aristophanes is parodying Socrates' well-known ethical concern,
his care for the soul.
Plato uses the noun, psychagogia, only in the Phaedrus; but the
verbal form occurs in two other dialogues. In the Laws (909b), he
plays on the basic sense of "conjuring" souls of the dead to add to
it the notion of "beguiling" the living; and in the Timaeus (71a) he
uses the verb to refer to the beguilement of the desiring part of the
soul by means of images. His contemporary and rival, Isocrates, uses
the verb to describe the effect of poetic devices on the listener. In
Evagoras (10), he points out that poets can "charm" their listeners
with beautiful rhythms and harmonies even though their diction and
thoughts may be poor; and in To Nicocles (49), he remarks that
rhetoricians who wish to "allure" their listeners must use the crowd-
pleasing device of myth, just like the poets.
Gorgias did not use the term, as far as we know. But it is well
suited to convey his notion that speech has the power to effect "most
divine" deeds, as attested by poetry and magical incantations. It fits
even more directly his claim that words have the same power with
respect to the soul as drugs have with respect to the body; as a result,
Gorgias held, a speaker can shape a soul in whatever way he wishes
and in particular "drug" and "bewitch" a soul "by an evil persua-
sion."^
The term psychagogia in Socrates' definition thus agrees with the
familiar notion of rhetoric as a power that works on the soul and
may be used to deceive it. But as the argument of the Phaedrus
proceeds, a new meaning unfolds. Socrates gradually develops the
view that genuine rhetoric is an art by which a speaker guides another
to the truth by adjusting his words to the other's soul. Rhetoric no
longer appears as a pseudo-art of deception, but is shown to be an
^ Evanghelos Moutsopolos has a brief survey of the uses of ^uxaTWTta in La
Musique dans I'oeuvre de Platon (Paris 1959), pp. 259-60.
^ Praise of Helen 8-14.
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art of teaching individuals to discover the truth about themselves.
After considerable argument, Socrates is ready to drav^ attention to
the component psychagogia in his definition. The new term in fact
sums up everything that is new about his view of rhetoric. Reverting
to his definition, Socrates claims that "since the function of speech
is psychagogia''' (271c), the rhetorician must know the types of soul,
as well as be able to recognize actual occurrences. Socrates now relies
on the etymology of the term psychagogia to reveal its underlying,
true meaning, "guidance of the soul." Only sham rhetoric beguiles
others; real rhetoric guides souls to self-knowledge through a knowl-
edge of soul.
The notion of psychagogia thus has pivotal importance in the
Phaedrus. Its importance, moreover, is not confined to the latter part
of the dialogue. It serves as a theme for the entire dialogue. Just as
in his dialectical discussion Socrates moves from the notion of a sham
rhetoric to that of a genuine rhetoric, so the action of the dialogue
as a whole moves from a display of pseudo-rhetoric to a revelation
of genuine rhetoric; and this is a transition from psychagogia as
beguilement to psychagogia as guidance of the soul. Throughout this
progression, Socrates serves as an example of a true rhetorician and
true "psychagogue." Against Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates as
conjuror of souls, Plato sets a portrait of Socrates as a "psychagogue"
who guides souls to the truth by seeking it himself.
This psychagogia has four stages. First, Socrates joins Phaedrus in
an apparent celebration of Lysias' speech (227a-34c); second, Socrates
undertakes to deliver a speech of his own, to rival Lysias' speech
(234c-42a); third, Socrates opposes this speech with a mythical
recantation that reveals something of the truth (242a-57b); and
fourth, Socrates teaches by a dialectical examination, which exem-
plifies genuine rhetoric, that genuine rhetoric consists in a dialectical
search for the truth (257b-79c). Each succeeding stage is built on
the preceding stages; and the whole forms a sequence in which each
part is complemented by all the others. The remainder of this paper
will examine this relationship among the four stages.
The dialogue begins with a meeting between Phaedrus and Socrates
close to the city walls. Phaedrus is enthralled by a speech of Lysias,
in which the speaker attempts to seduce "someone beautiful" (227c),
whom he does not love, by pleading ingeniously that it is advantageous
for a person to yield to a non-lover, not a lover. Phaedrus is so
impressed by the speech that he has spent the entire morning
memorizing it. But we do not learn this fact from Phaedrus; we learn
it in time, and with precise details, from Socrates, who is invited by
Phaedrus to join him in a walk outside the city. When Socrates asks
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Phaedrus to recite the speech to him, and Phaedrus replies that his
memory can't possibly do justice to a speech composed over a long
period of time by the cleverest of present writers, Socrates exclaims:
"If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself" (228a). He then
reveals all: that Phaedrus first had Lysias recite the speech repeatedly,
then borrowed the manuscript to study it, and finally went outside
the city, manuscript in hand, to practice it. Socrates knows Phaedrus
well; and as a clinching demonstration of his insight, he makes
Phaedrus come up with the manuscript that he has been hiding under
his cloak. In exposing Phaedrus, Socrates shows that he recognizes
with whom he is dealing. We shall learn later that a knowledge of
the other's soul is a prerequisite of the true orator.
The opening scene shows us a Socrates who is no less enthusiastic
about getting to know Lysias' speech than Phaedrus is about learning
it by heart. Socrates describes himself as a "fellow bacchic reveler"
{(xvyKopv^avTLO}PTa)y who is so passionate a "lover of discourses" as
to be "sick" about listening to them (228b-c). Socrates' and Phaedrus'
walk into the countryside looks indeed like a bacchic revel, with
overtones of comedy, in which the two celebrants lead each other in
turn. First Phaedrus invites Socrates to lead on (227c, 228b) and
Socrates suggests that they turn away from the road to go along the
river-bed in search of a secluded spot (229a). Subsequently Phaedrus
picks out a spot and leads Socrates to it. The landscape takes on an
air of mystery, as Phaedrus recalls the story of Oreithyia being
snatched by Boreas (229b). It is as though the pair of worshippers,
too, has been carried off by some supernatural power. This impression
is reinforced when the spot, which Phaedrus picked out from a
distance, turns out to be a grove sacred to the Nymphs and the river-
god Achelous. Socrates duly celebrates the grove with a lyrical
description; and he thanks Phaedrus for leading him, like a stranger,
to an alien territory {e^evayrjTaL, 230c), the countryside. Phaedrus
acknowledges that Socrates is indeed like a stranger who has been
led {^evayovfievu)). Socrates' explanation for this xenagogia is that
Phaedrus has found a drug by which to lead him wherever he wishes:
this is to dangle "discourses in books" in front of him just as others
dangle fruit or branches in front of animals that are hungry (230d-e).
This Bacchic revel and xeriagogia is also a psychagogia. The souls of
both men have been conjured to an alien territory by the drug-like
power of words. On the surface, Phaedrus has acted as leader in this
journey: beguiled by Lysias' speech, he seems to have beguiled Socrates
and lured him to a place of estrangement. But in reality, as will
become increasingly clear, Socrates has been Phaedrus' leader: guided
by a divine power, he has guided Phaedrus to a place of purification.
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where both men may be truly at home. Socrates claims he is entranced:
in reality he has a perfect grip on himself. There is a glimmer of the
true state of affairs when, in response to Phaedrus' question where
Oreithyia was carried off, Socrates is able to give an answer ("two
or three stades downstream, where we cross to Agra," 229c). The
stranger, Socrates, knows the territory better than Phaedrus. Then,
in the discussion concerning Oreithyia, Socrates remarks that he is
still searching to know himself (229e). Although he seems to have
been swept away by Dionysiac enthusiasm, Socrates keeps in mind
his life's goal. Acting as a "psychagogue," he associates Phaedrus with
himself in a search for self-knowledge, by guiding him to a holy place
where Phaedrus may be healed of his evil enchantment.
The topography provides a suitable setting for the psychagogia. Not
only do the two men journey to an unfamiliar place, but there is a
physical boundary that separates their normal abode from the alien
territory. In order to reach the sacred grove, they must cross a river.
This river serves as a sacred border, like the body of water outside
Hades that separates the souls of the living from the souls of the
dead. Later Socrates will be prevented by his inner voice from
crossing the river until he has performed a ritual expiation (242b-c);
and finally both men cross the river after offering a prayer to- Pan
and the other deities of the place (279b-c). As though conjured by
a ritual act, the souls of the two men have been transported to a
realm from which they are normally excluded and win their release
through ritual purification. The extraordinary setting of the Phaedrus,
which has surprised and delighted the readers of Plato, introduces
the theme of the entire dialogue, rhetoric as psychagogia.
After Phaedrus has read aloud Lysias' speech, Socrates confirms
that he has engaged in a Bacchic celebration with Phaedrus {avve-
iSaKx^vaa, 234d). But he now attributes his enchantment, not to the
speech itself, but to Phaedrus' excessive delight at the speech. By
transferring his enthusiasm from the speech to the hearer, Socrates
now assumes the role of lover of Phaedrus.^ In order to lure Phaedrus
away from his admiration of Lysias, he also sets himself up as a
rhetorical rival to Lysias. His immediate strategy is to hurl an
apparently rash challenge: he claims that "ancient wise men and
women" (235b) have spoken and written more copiously on the same
® Anne Lebeck notes in "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus" {Greek, Roman
and Byzantine Studies 13 [1972], 267-90, p. 281) that Socrates is here overcome by
the sight of his beloved, Phaedrus, in just the way that Socrates later describes in
the recantation (254b). V. Tejera aptly views Phaedrus as the "erotic . . . generator"
of both of Socrates' speeches ("Irony and Allegory in the Phaedrus," Philosophy and
Rhetoric 8 [1975], 71-87. p. 74).
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subject treated by Lysias and that he, Socrates, could do better
himself. Socrates is careful to attribute his own fullness of invention
to some source that he can't name just at present, "perhaps beautiful
Sappho or wise Anacreon or even some prose writers {<Tvyypa(t>€Oi}vy'
(235c). He says that he knows he is ignorant; so it must be that he
got his inspiration from elsewhere and that "because of my stupidity
I have forgotten this very thing, how and from whom I heard"
(235d).
Who, if anyone, is Socrates' source? Malcolm Brown and James
Coulter have shown in detail that the organization and content of
Socrates' first speech are Isocratean.' The most important Isocratean
features pointed out by them are: clear organization, based on a clear
determination of the subject matter, sometimes by means of a defi-
nition; the view that human beings are guided by opinion {86^a) or
desire (e7^l^u/x^a); the praise of "divine philosophy" (239b); and the
claim that nothing is more valuable for humans or gods than "the
education of the soul" (241c). As Brown and Coulter point out, Plato
considered this a debased view of philosophy and of human nature,
since it substitutes opinion for knowledge and cold calculation of
material advantages for a commitment to truth.
Another Isocratean feature, pointed out by R. L. Howland, is the
overall purpose of the speech, that of improving on a rival rhetorician
by composing .a speech on the same theme. ^ Isocrates' Busiris is
particularly pertinent. Here Isocrates attempts to outdo his rival,
Polycrates, by first defining what an encomium is; and he ends by
admitting that even though both he and his rival may be speaking
falsehoods, his speech is superior because it is properly an encomium.^
There are further indications that Socrates is using Isocrates as a
model for his first speech. With some emphasis, Socrates draws
attention to the rhythmic quality of his speech. Shortly after he has
started his speech, he breaks off by saying that he is already close to
speaking in dithyrambs (238d); and when he ends, he says that he is
no longer talking in dithyrambs but in epic verse (24 le). The use of
rhythm was a conspicuous feature of Isocrates' style. Well aware that
^ "The Middle Speech of Plato's Phaedrus," Journal of the History of Philosophy 9
(1971), 405-23.
^ "The Attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus," Classical Quarterly 31 (1937), 151-59,
p. 153. The Helen (composed about 370 B.C.) and Busiris (about 390 B.C.) are two
outstanding examples of this endeavor. Another example is the Panegyricus (380 B.C.),
where Isocrates tries to outdo the many predecessors who have spoken on the same
theme by choosing the right starting-point (15).
^ Busiris 9 and 33. In the Helen (14-15), Isocrates likewise proposes to improve
upon a rival (Gorgias) by first making clear what an encomium is.
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poets charm their listeners by the use of rhythm, Isocrates demanded
in his programmatic Agaiyist the Sophists that the rhetorician must
speak "rhythmically and musically" {evpvdfiooq Kal )uoi;(7i/ca)^).'" As he
claimed in late life, his speeches are akin to poetry, that is, to works
composed "with music and rhythms" (/ucra novcrtKriq Kal pvdixcbv), and
have "a rather poetic and elaborate diction";" and they tend to be
adorned "with beautiful rhythms and elaboration" (evpvdniaLC, Kal
Moreover, Socrates seems to plant a clue in the very way that he
describes the source that, he says, eludes him. Isocrates was a prose
writer {avyypacjxvq) who advised his students not to be ignorant of
the poets and other "wise persons" {oo^lotCju) but to cull from them
what is best just as bees gather honey from flowers.'^ Socrates has a
convenient excuse for his forgetfulness: Isocrates' speeches are a
repertory of second-hand ideas; and it is hard to see anything original
in his speeches. '"*
The reader knows from other dialogues to be wary of Socrates'
confessions of ignorance and forgetfulness. In the Phaedrus, there is
'" Against the Sophists 16 (composed about 390 B.C., roughly the time at which
Isocrates founded his school). Isocrates demanded poetic rhythm in his Tfx«"/ (Sauppe
II 225), ntfuxOw irafTi pvdnw naXiara Cafi^tKu fi TpoxdUw. R. C. Jebb discusses the
importance of prose rhythm in Isocrates' rhetoric in his The Attic Orators, vol. 2,
London 1893, pp. 56-58. For the actual rhythms used by Socrates in his speech, see
Karl Mras, "Platos Phaedrus und die Rhetorik," part 2, Wiener Studien 37 (1915),
88-117, pp. 96-97.
'
' Antidosis 46-47 (dated 354-53 B.C.).
'- To Philip 27 (dated 346 B.C.).
'' To Demonicus 51-52 (dated about 374-72 B.C.); and To Nicodes 13 (dated about
the same time). In To Nicodes, Isocrates also mentions that Hesiod, Theognis, and
Phocylides are agreed to be "excellent counsellors for the life of men" (43). Isocrates'
praise of the poets is not unmixed; along with much wisdom, he also attributes to
them calumnies and lies (for example, at Busiris 38). On Isocrates' eclecticism, see
also the next note.
'^ There are, I think, other allusions to Isocrates in the way in which Socrates
leads up to his speech; but these are difficult to prove and carry weight only in
combination. There is, 1 think, an allusion to Isocrates in the friendly bargaining
that goes on between Phaedrus and Socrates prior to Socrates' delivery of the speech.
Phaedrus would have Socrates use none of the arguments used by Lysias; and Socrates
protests that he should be allowed to use those arguments of Lysias which are
inevitable in any treatment of the subject (235e-36a). Isocrates maintains in his
famous Panegyricus (8) that "one must not avoid those subjects about which others
have spoken previously but one must try to speak better than them" (8); and in To
Nicodes (41) he excuses his lack of originality by saying that in speeches of this type
one should look not for novelty, but for the ability to "bring together the greatest
number of ideas scattered in the thoughts of others and speak most beautifully about
them." Socrates, it seems to me, is imitating Isocrates' eclecticism. It is true that in
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special reason to suppose that Socrates is toying with his interlocutor.
Socrates has been playing with Phaedrus at uncovering Phaedrus'
devotion to Lysias. We saw Phaedrus hiding Lysias' manuscript and
protesting that he can't recite his speech; and we saw Socrates
uncovering the subterfuge and teasing Phaedrus about it. A similar
scene is now being staged, with roles reversed. Socrates now plays
the role of the enthusiastic and bashful student of rhetoric, and he
gives Phaedrus a chance at uncovering his rhetorical inspiration.
After boasting of his rhetorical capacity, Socrates suddenly becomes
reluctant: he says that he has been teasing Phaedrus, and that he
really can't deliver a more refined speech than Lysias'. Thereupon
Phaedrus sees through Socrates, just as Socrates saw through him
earlier. Phaedrus says: "If I don't know Socrates, I've forgotten
myself"; and he accuses Socrates of playing coy. Phaedrus uncovers
Socrates' desire to speak. In time, he also uncovers his source.
Phaedrus reveals the source to us at the very end of the dialogue
when, in response to Socrates' command to tell his friend Lysias
about true rhetoric, Phaedrus commands Socrates to tell his friend
too. Socrates asks coyly who this is, and Phaedrus replies: "The
beautiful Isocrates" (278e). Isocrates has not been named at all before
this; and his mention at the close of the dialogue may surprise the
reader. Isocrates has, however, been very much present throughout
the dialogue; and the first allusion to him is in the way Socrates
describes the source of his first speech.
Socrates delivers his speech, covered up "in shame," as he says.
The pose is appropriate because he is hiding behind Isocrates, whose
message is shameful. But Socrates also arranges very carefully that
he has nothing, really, to be ashamed of. In the first place, he
announces at the very beginning that the speech is addressed to a
"boy, or rather youngster {neipaKicrKoq), very beautiful" (237b) by one
the Helen (15) Isocrates announces that he will leave aside everything that others
have said. This has led Howland to suggest that in demanding the right to use some
of his rival's arguments Socrates in fact attacks Isocrates, by showing that his straining
for novelty is absurd (p. 154 of the article cited in note 8). 1 suggest that in the Helen
Isocrates is demonstrating that he can do what he normally chooses not to do. Plato
parodies Isocrates by having Phaedrus attempt to impose the conditions of the Helen
on Socrates, who is imitating Isocrates, and then having Socrates respond, appro-
priately, with an Isocratean position.
I suspect that there is another allusion to Isocrates, in particular the Panegyricus
(which was read at the hundredth Olympic festival in 380 B.C.), when Phaedrus
accepts Socrates' terms with the extravagant promise that if Socrates can outdo Lysias
on these terms he will set up a statue of Socrates at Olympia (236b). Phaedrus here
exalts Socrates to the rank of the famous rhetoricians who composed for the Olympic
festival, among them Gorgias, Lysias, and— most exalted— Isocrates.
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of his many lovers, who cleverly pretends not to be in love with him.
The speech is, therefore, an exercise in the professional rhetorician's
pseudo-art of deception. Socrates denounces this type of exercise
later in the dialectical discussion, when he points out that some
rhetoricians maintain that there is no need to know the truth, since
arguments from likelihood (ekoi;) are more convincing than the truth
(272d-74a). But Socrates differs from the ordinary rhetorician in
announcing his subterfuge at the outset. By using this stratagem, he
not only guards against the charge of deceiving his listener, but also
suggests that Lysias' speech is in fact a piece of deception perpetrated
by a lover who pretends not to be one.
Socrates invokes the "boy" at the beginning of his speech (237b)
and refers to him again later by saying that "we must return to the
boy" (238d). The same "boy" is invoked by Socrates at the beginning
of his second speech, the recantation. Socrates now asks where the
boy is to whom his previous speech was addressed, and Phaedrus
answers: "Here he is, next to you, always very close, whenever you
want him" (243e). The beautiful boy to whom Socrates addresses
both his speeches is none other than Phaedrus. He is listener and
addressee at once. Hence Socrates has another, subtler defense against
the charge of deception: he cannot be accused of deceiving the "boy"
of his first speech, because he is the very person he warns against
the deception. As the exchange at the beginning of the recantation
tells us, Socrates has succeeded in attracting Phaedrus' love. He has
done so in the manner of a genuine rhetorician by adjusting his
words to the soul of his listener: he has impressed Phaedrus by
constructing a speech which is on the surface no less ingeniously
deceptive than that of Lysias, but which is in fact designed to be
truthful.
Furthermore, Socrates bases all the arguments of his first speech
on a definition of love as an irrational desire for the enjoyment of
bodily beauty In his recantation later on, Socrates shows that the
definition is misguided: it defines a left-handed, perverse type of love,
as opposed to a right-handed, genuine love. Hence all his arguments
showing that a lover is harmful to his beloved are unsound. But to
the extent that the definition applies to an attitude commonly called
"love," the arguments are sound. Socrates is truthful in arguing: if
love is a certain irrational desire, then it is harmful to associate with
a lover. Because all of the speech hinges on an explicit definition of
love, and this definition corresponds to a certain attitude that passes
as "love," even though it does not state the truth about love, Socrates
is not in fact deceiving his listener.
Socrates deliberately does not give Phaedrus a chance to applaud
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his speech. He stops the speech abruptly at mid-point, after completing
his arguments against the lover and before adding any arguments in
favor of the non-lover. Socrates explains to the bewildered Phaedrus
that if he goes on, he will surely be possessed by the nymphs to
whom Phaedrus threw him (24 le). He feigns madness of the left-
handed kind, as he will make clear later, in order to let himself be
swayed subsequently by a prophetic power that exemplifies a right-
handed, or divine, kind of madness (242c).
Prevented by his inner voice from crossing the river, Socrates
undertakes to purify himself by a speech of recantation. This new
speech not only subverts, but also complements the preceding speech.
We expected a praise of the non-lover; but Socrates now offers a
praise of the genuine lover to balance the previous condemnation of
the debased lover. The new speech complements the other by showing
that there is a genuine type of love, the love of soul and of truth, as
opposed to the fake love that is directed at another's body. The two
speeches together show that the latter type of love is to be shunned,
the former to be pursued. The speeches thus form a carefully
constructed progression, in which the first speech turns out to be a
fragment that is completed and given new meaning by the second.
In his recantation, Socrates continues to aim his remarks at
Phaedrus, invoking him at intervals as "beautiful boy" or "boy"
(243e, 252b, 256e). Again he adjusts both content and style to
Phaedrus. He now uses myth to turn Phaedrus from falsehood to
truth; and he acknowledges his rhetorical strategy ironically at the
end by excusing himself to Eros for the "poetic expressions" which
Phaedrus forced on him (257a). The use of myth is intended to lift
Phaedrus' awareness from the narrow focus on human selfishness in
the Isocratean speech to a new cosmic vision, in which humans aim
to recover a divine condition of knowledge through love of another.
Socrates now shows Phaedrus that reason is the guiding faculty of
the human soul and that genuine philosophy is a search for divine
enlightenment.
In this praise of love, which turns out to be a praise of the love
of wisdom, philosophy, Socrates not only practices genuine rhetorical
psychogogia, but also makes psychagogia the subject of his discourse.
He shows that the lover guides the soul of another toward its former
divine condition and thereby guides and finds himself. The genuine
rhetorician, we will learn later, has the same aim as the lover; and
ultimately genuine rhetoric and genuine love will appear as one.
Socrates later describes his speech as a playful "mythic hymn"
which "perhaps" touches upon the truth and is not "altogether
unconvincing," and which honors "with measure and pious speech
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(nerpiuq re kol ev<i)rjij.(t)q) my master and yours, o Phaedrus, Eros, the
guardian of beautiful boys" (265b-c). Not only is the content of the
myth clearly anti-Isocratean, but Socrates sums up the difference
between his and Isocrates' rhetoric by the phrase "with measure and
pious speech." As we saw earlier, Isocrates demanded in Against the
Sophists that the rhetorician speak "rhythmically and musically"
{evpvdiiuic, Kal novaLKooq), and he took pride in his use of poetic rhythms.
In his previous parody of Isocrates, Socrates drew attention to the
use of poetic measures. In his new speech, Socrates replaces the
measures of poetry with genuine measure— the measure of truth
and piety. The phrase utTploic, re /cat
€V(t)r}fx(t)q serves as a signal that
Socrates is replacing Isocratean rhetoric with a rhetoric of truth. As
Socrates later states explicitly, this new rhetoric aims at pleasing the
gods, not humans (273e).
The succession of three speeches thus constitutes a transition from
Lysianic to Isocratean rhetoric and then to a new rhetoric that
repudiates both of these kinds. When Socrates finishes his recantation,
he has won over Phaedrus to the new rhetoric. Phaedrus joins
enthusiastically in Socrates' prayer that Lysias should abandon his
kind of rhetoric and turn to philosophy and that he, Phaedrus, should
devote himself entirely to the love that is accompanied by philosophy;
and he abandons Lysias as vulgar (TaireLvoc,, 257c). But Phaedrus has
little understanding of what the new love entails. Nor indeed is
Socrates' unfolding of a new rhetoric complete at this point. Socrates'
speech of recantation is itself a fragment: it must be followed by
dialectical discussion if it is to count as a contribution to genuine
rhetoric. Myth is but a step toward understanding: it needs to be
complemented by rational, dialectical examination if it is to be part
of a genuine philosophical search.
Socrates therefore detains Phaedrus in the sacred grove while he
teaches him by example and precept at once what genuine rhetoric
is. The issue raised by Lysias' manuscript at the beginning of the
dialogue is: how does one write well? Socrates tackles it by asking
the prior question: how does one speak well? As a prelude to the
discussion, Socrates invokes certain "noble creatures"—arguments—
to come "and persuade the beautiful boy Phaedrus {KaXXiirmda re
^albpov irddeTe) that unless he philosophizes adequately, he will never
be an adequate speaker about anything" (261a). In his reference to
Phaedrus, Socrates makes clear that the new section of discourse,
like his preceding two speeches, is aimed directly at Phaedrus.
Moreover, the juxtaposition of "beautiful boy" and "Phaedrus," with
the pun iraid- . . . ^aiS-, indicates that Phaedrus is identical with the
beautiful "boy" who has kept reappearing throughout the dialogue.
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The name "Phaedrus" signifies "bright" and "boy": Phaedrus is the
bright boy, the beautiful boy, who has attracted Socrates all along
and who, we may assume, attracted Lysias.'^ The beautiful boy appears
for a final time at the very end of the dialogue. Here Socrates prays
that he may become beautiful inside, and Phaedrus joins in this
prayer. The beautiful boy Phaedrus is to become beautiful in soul,
along with his dialectical associate and teacher, the lover of his soul
and of wisdom in general, Socrates.
We have already touched on some of the arguments of the dialectical
section. Appropriately, Socrates begins his argument with a definition
'^ The same pun, with the same identification of "beautiful boy" with "Phaedrus,"
occurs again at 265c: ..." Epwra, l) ^atdpt, KaXwv iraldwv ((popov. Paul Plass rightly
notes that KaXKiiraic, echoes the vocatives of KaXb(; irai; of Socrates' recantation (p. 37
of the article cited in note 1); in my view, the term echoes all references to "beautiful
boy" throughout the Phaedrus.
Some scholars have held that Phaedrus was too old at the dramatic date of the
dialogue to qualify as the "boy" of Socrates' two speeches. L. Parmentier argued
that since Phaedrus, who appears in the Protagoras (315c) as a disciple of Hippias,
must already have been about eighteen in 432 B.C., the dramatic date of the Protagoras,
and since the dramatic date of the Phaedrus is about 410 B.C., Phaedrus could no
longer have been young in the Phaedrus ("L'Age de Phedre dans le dialogue de
Platon," Bulleti7i de I'Associatmi Guillaume Bud'e 10 (1926), 8-21). G.J. de Vries agrees
with Parmentier that Phaedrus was not a young man in the Phaedrus, although he
thinks Plato had no precise dramatic date in mind {A Commentary on the Phaedrus of
Plato, Amsterdam 1969, pp. 6-7). R. Hackforth, who suggests a dramatic date early
in the period 411-404 B.C., thinks that Phaedrus would be about. forty {Plato's
Phaedrus, translation and commentary, Cambridge 1952, p. 8). De Vries and Hackforth
agree that such a mature age would not prevent Socrates from addressing Phaedrus
as "boy" (iral, 267c) and "young man" {veavia, 257c); and they explain Phaedrus'
response to Socrates at 243e as a "fiction" (de Vries, p. 113) and as something
"playful" (Hackforth, p. 53, n. 1). They also assign to/caXXi7rai6a(261a) the implausible
sense of "begetter of beautiful discourses" (De Vries, p. 202; Hackforth, p. 121).
This sense was suggested by the Neoplatonist Hermeias as an alternative to the
straightforward meaning "beautiful boy" (p. 223 of the edition cited in note 1).
As for the dramatic date of the Phaedrus, K. J. Dover has argued persuasively for
the period 418-16 B.C. {Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, Berkeley 1968, pp. 41-43).
This brings the dramatic date of the Phaedrus close to that of the Syynposium, about
416 B.C. In this dialogue Agathon is depicted as a beautiful young man {viov at 175e,
HiipaKiM at 223a), whose charms are irresistible to Socrates and Alcibiades. The same
Agathon is presented in the Protagoras as "still a young lad" {viop tl Itl tiupocKiov) and
beautiful (315d). E. Zeller pointed out that there is a slight anachronism between
the description of Agathon in the Protagoras (about 432 B.C.) as still young and the
description of him in the Symposium as young (Uber die Anachronismen in den platonischen
Gesprachen, Berlin 1873, p. 86). There is an analogous anachronism, I suggest,
concerning Phaedrus. Since Socrates calls him "boy" (267c), "young man" (257c),
and "beautiful boy" (261a), we must suppose that he is a young person in the
Phaedrus. Phaedrus is also a young person in the Protagoras: his youth, it appears, is
just as lasting as the beautiful Agathon's.
I
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of rhetoric. He will specify later that any discussion that is to be
orderly must begin with a definition. As previously discussed, Socrates
offers a new definition of rhetoric as a "psychagogia in words" that
occurs both in public and in private (261a-b). The shift from public
to private rhetoric, we now recognize, reflects a new concern with
Isocratean rhetoric, whose primary aim is not to influence the public,
but to educate individuals through private communication. The threat
perceived by Plato is no longer Gorgianic demagoguery, but Isocratean
"philosophy." That is why Socrates undertakes to show Phaedrus
how one must practice genuine philosophy.
Although Plato does not mention Isocrates by name until the very
end of the dialogue, all of the demands stated by him in the dialectical
section imply a reform of Isocratean rhetoric. In the first place,
Socrates argues that since a rhetorician must know the truth in order
to be skillful at leading a person from one belief to its opposite, the
person who "hunts out opinions" (262c) will not possess a genuine
art of rhetoric. Isocrates maintained that the rhetorician requires
appropriate opinions, not knowledge; and Socrates previously ex-
emplified this point of view in his first speech.'*^ Socrates now responds
directly to Isocrates: given that the skilled rhetorician is able to make
the listener believe anything at all, the rhetorician must know the
truth, and not be content with plausible opinions.
Next, Socrates takes Isocrates' demand for an initial definition of
the subject matter and transforms it into a demand for dialectical
knowledge." The rhetorician, it now turns out, must have the
dialectical ability both to gather instances into a single form (idea)
'® See especially Against the Sophists 8, where Isocrates claims that those who rely
on "opinions" are more successful than those who profess to have "knowledge," and
Helen 5, where he claims that "it is much better to have suitable opinions about what
is useful than to have accurate knowledge about what is useless."
" There is a strong verbal similarity between the way in which Socrates sets out
the requirement for definition in the Phaedrus and the way Isocrates proposes to
define the function of a king in To Nicocles (dated about 374-72 B.C.). Isocrates writes:
"First we must investigate what is the function of kings; for if we encompass
(jipika^wtitv) the force {bvvatixv) of the whole matter in a summary, we shall speak
better about the parts by looking toward {airo0\i-KOVT%) this. I think that all men
would agree (b^oXoyfiaai) . . ." {To Nicocles 9; cf. 2, where the term bpiaai. is used).
Similarly Socrates uses the expressions bvvaniv, bfioXoyia Oitiivoi Spov, and airo^Xt-Kovnc,
in defining love in his first speech (237c-d) and later uses irepiXaix^6a>(ii> (273e). Late
in his life, Isocrates again uses the terms awofiXiiroi'Tic, {On the Peace 18) and iripiXa^ufiev
{Antidosis 217) with reference to initial definition. This similarity, together with other
similarities between the Phaedrus and To Nicocles (see notes 13 and 14), suggests that
Plato had in mind To Nicocles (along with earlier speeches) when composing the
Phaedrus. This view is in accord with the date now generally assigned to the
composition of the Phaedrus. Whereas most scholars of the nineteenth century assumed
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and to divide forms into types (262c-66d). Socrates illustrates this
transformation in his sequence of two speeches. In his first speech,
he uses Isocratean definition to delineate a perverse type of love and
to construct an example of perverse rhetoric. In the recantation,
Socrates uses dialectical skill to propose that genuine love is a type
of divine madness and to suggest that genuine rhetoric is a search
for truth. As Socrates himself points out (265c), it was dialectical skill
(for which he disclaims credit) that enabled Socrates to pass from a
condemnation to a praise of love. Like the pseudo-rhetorician, Soc-
rates moves from one position to its opposite; but unlike the pseudo-
rhetorician, he guides the listener from falsehood to truth.
The third main departure from Isocratean rhetoric consists in
Socrates' demand that the rhetorician must have a knowledge of soul
in general and of the soul of the listener in particular. This departure
is an added precision, based on the preceding two reforms. Here,
the initial Isocratean position is unmistakable. In Against the Sophists
Isocrates criticized his fellow rhetoricians for thinking that the whole
of rhetoric consists in a knowledge of its components, the types of
discourse, without there being any need for the ability to combine
them. Isocrates claims that "it is not very difficult to know the forms
(tSecoj^) out of which we make and compose all speches" (16). Then
he sums up his teaching about rhetoric:
But it requires much care and is the job of a manly soul that has
opinions {\(/vxri<i ocvdptKriq Kot do^acTLKTiq) to choose the forms that are
necessary for each subject and to mix them with one another and to
arrange them properly, and, further, not to miss the right opportunities
(fcmpoji/) but to elaborate the whole speech fittingly {irpeTrovTuq) with
thoughts and to speak rhythmically and musically {evpvdixwc, koI p,ovaiKU}<;)
in the choice of words (16-17).
After summarizing the duties of both student and teacher, Isocrates
concludes:
an early date (relying in part on Diogenes Laertius' report of a tradition that the
Phaedrus was Plato's first dialogue, 3. 38; and on the view of Olympiodorus, in the
sixth century ad., that it was first, Vita Platonis 3), Leon Robin {La Theorie platonicienne
de VAmour, Paris 1 908) and Hans von Arnim {Platosjugeyiddialoge und die Entstehungszeit
des Phaidros, Leipzig 1914) showed that its date of composition must be later than
the Republic. Hackforth dates the Phaedrus close to the Parmenides and Theaetetus,
with the conjecture that it was composed about 370 B.C. (pp. 4-7 of the edition cited
in note 15); and de Vries dates it a few years later, also close to the Theaetetus (pp.
7-11 of the commentary cited in note 15). I am inclined to agree with W. K. C.
Guthrie that it is "much more in the spirit of the middle group than of the Sophist"
{A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, p. 397); a date of about 374-370
B.C. seems to me appropriate.
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When all these requirements coincide, those who practice philosophy
will attain perfection. But to the extent that they fall short of anything
that has been said, those who approach it will be inferior.'*
It is not enough for a rhetorician, according to Isocrates, to know
the types of discourse. Instead, the essential features of good rhetoric
are: an orderly arrangement of types of speech; a recognition of the
right opportunity; fitting opinions; and harmonious expression.
Similarly to Isocrates, Socrates criticizes the writers of rhetorical
hand-books for teaching only the "preliminaries" of the art in teaching
just the components (268a-69c). He then goes on to draw out the
implication, which Isocrates never contemplated, that the genuine
rhetorician must know the various types of soul, as well as recognize
particular souls, in order to be able to know what type of speech is
suitable for a particular person (269d-72b). He sums up his teaching
about rhetoric as follows. Since the function of speech is psychagogia
(271c), the speaker must first know the types of soul and the
corresponding types of discourse, then observe both souls and speeches
and learn to recognize particular souls as requiring particular types
of discourse. When one has learned all this, and in addition recognizes
the right occasions (Kaipovq) for speaking and keeping silent, then
the art is beautifully and completely perfected, but not before. But if
anyone falls short of any of this in speaking or teaching or writing,
though claiming to speak with art, the person who is not persuaded
is the winner.'^
This summary, which hinges on the definition of rhetoric as
psychagogia, is a counterproposal to Isocrates' statement in Against the
Sophists. Plato knew this statement well. He first parodied it in the
Gorgias, when Socrates claims that contemporary rhetoric is not an
art {rex^t]), but flattery practiced by a "conjecturing and manly soul"
{\pvxfiq . . . oToxoccFTLKfiq Kal avdpeiaq, 463a). ^° In the Phaedrus Plato
'* Agaiyist the Sophists 16—18: to 5e tovt<j3v €</>' iKCxaTU) tuu irpayfiSiTwv aq 5« irpoiXeaOai
Kal iju^ai Trpoi; aXA^Xa? kol ra^ai Kara rpoirov, in hi twv Kaipibv firi bianapruv, aXKa Koi rdtq
ivdviir/naai TTpeTroi/Twq SXou rov \6yov KarairoiKiXai Koi rotq ovofiaaiv ejpvdfiwq koi hovoikCx,
aireli>, ravra 51 iroXXfic, iirifitXeiac, 5(t<T$ai Kal ^^x^*; otudpiKric, koI 6o|affTiK^ (pyov uvai. . . . Koi
TOVTwv piv airavTwv avpntiawTdiv TtXttwc, ?^ovaiv oi 4>i\o(TO<t)OWTfq- Kad' o d' av iWaipd^ ti tCiv
apr]fi(v(i)v, avajKri Taxntf x^pov biaKiurdai roiiq itXtjaia^ovTaq. Isocrates offers a briefsummary
of his main requirements at Panegyricus 9. He also stresses the importance of right
combination and right occasion at Helen 1 1
.
'^ Phaedrus 272b: . . . KaXw<; n koi rtXiwc, iarlv r\ rex"! ocirapyaanivri, irpbrtpov 8' ov.
aXX' S Ti au ocvtwu tic, iXXeiirr) X67a;/' ^ 8i5aaKwv fi ypoupuv, (py 8i rtx"!? Xeyav, b prj traddp-iixx;
KpaTtt.
^° W. H. Thompson points out this parody in his edition, The Phaedrus of Plato,
London 1868, reprinted New York 1973, p. 174.
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responds to Isocrates' statement in detail. In place of Isocrates'
evpvdnCoq Kal ixovaLKcbq, he puts nerpicoq re Kal eixprjfiooq, as we have seen.
In place of opinions, he puts knowledge. He transforms the require-
ment for orderliness and combinatorial skill into a requirement for
dialectical analysis and a knowledge of soul. A "fitting" speech thus
becomes a discourse adapted to teaching another the truth. Socrates
pointedly keeps the important Isocratean requirement for "right
occasion," Katpoc,, but transforms it into a requirement for knowing
when to use words of a particular sort to a particular person. Finally,
Socrates takes direct aim at Isocrates in his concluding statement.
Isocrates made the tautological claim that deficient rhetoricians are
inferior. Using words that carefully balance Isocrates' wording, Soc-
rates responds with the pointedly meaningful remark that the pseudo-
rhetorician's opponent is superior. Socrates here denies that Isocrates
has a genuine art of rhetoric and claims the superiority of his demands
to those of Isocrates.^'
Socrates has been shown throughout the dialogue as striving for
a "perfect" rhetoric that is opposed to Isocrates'. From the beginning,
he has demonstrated an insight into Phaedrus' soul. Moreover, he is
clearly engaged in a search for knowledge of the soul in general and,
most importantly, of his own soul. In his recantation, he presents a
general theory of soul in mythic form; and he announces right at
the beginning of the dialogue that he is still searching to know himself,
as he investigates whether or not he is a beast "more complex than
Typhon" (230a). As for knowing when to speak and when to be
silent, surely Socrates has shown this ability all along.
After setting out his requirements for a genuine rhetoric, Socrates
returns to the problem with which the discussion began: how does
one write well (274b)? He argues that the real value of writing lies
in words "written" in the soul for the sake of instruction (278a).
These are words of truth planted in the soul like seeds, which are to
bear fruit and sow seeds in turn in other souls (276e-77a). Socrates
condemns writing that is used to freeze a discourse into an object of
unthinking memorization.
^' Howland points out the correspondence between Isocrates' and Socrates'
conclusions at p. 158 of the article cited in note 8. He also points out the similarity
between Isocrates' requirements for the student and Socrates' demands at 269d.
Hartmut Erbse discusses this latter correspondence in pp. 330-36 of "Platons Urteil
uber Isokrates" {Hermes 99 [1971], 183-97), reprinted in Isokrates, edited by F. Seek,
Darmstadt 1976, pp. 329-52. Plato also appears to subvert Isocrates' notion of
"fitting" in the Euthydemus, where Socrates criticizes at length a rhetorician whom
he does not name, but who cannot be anyone but Isocrates. Socrates here attributes
to his opponent "ejirpiireiav rather than truth" (305e).
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This final discussion balances the initial scene of the dialogue,
where we saw Phaedrus mindlessly and laboriously memorizing a
written speech by Lysias. But more than that, it serves as a final
condemnation of Isocrates. More than any other rhetorician, Isocrates
relied on written discourse. He was notorious for not speaking in
public, but writing discourses to be read in public; and he instructed
his pupils by having them memorize and imitate his written compo-
sitions. In clear contrast with Isocratean teaching, Socrates has been
instructing his pupil, Phaedrus, by involving him in discussion. He
ends the discussion, moreover, with a final example ofproper teaching:
he asks Phaedrus to convey what he has heard to Lysias (278e).
Phaedrus is to foster the seeds of truth planted in him by planting
similar seeds in another soul.
We might expect the dialogue to end here; but there is unfinished
business. So far, Socrates has overtly opposed only Lysias in particular
and contemporary rhetoricians in general. There has been no mention
of Isocrates, who, it has been argued, is the primary target of Socrates'
criticism. Plato has put a puzzle to the reader, sowing clues throughout
the dialogue. It is now time to reveal the mystery. The astute Phaedrus
has figured it out. He divulges his discovery at last, when Socrates
asks him to inform Lysias about genuine rhetoric. Putting his discovery
as a puzzle in turn, he asks Socrates to inform his friend too. Socrates
continues the game by asking "who?"; and Phaedrus tells: "The
beautiful Isocrates."
Socrates' ensuing comparison between Lysias and Isocrates has
provoked much controversy. Some consider his remarks about Iso-
crates a bitterly sarcastic denunciation of the rhetorician; others
regard it as high praise, or at least as praise tinged with regret. ^^
^^ Erbse argues (in the article cited in the preceding note) that although there
are similarities between Plato's and Isocrates' views of rhetoric (including a similarity
in their demands for the correct combination of types of discourse), Plato's require-
ments are basically different; hence Plato does not praise Isocrates without qualifi-
cation, as many have thought. He suggests instead that Plato has sincere praise for
Isocrates as genuinely superior to other rhetoricians, and that Plato honestly regrets
that Isocrates did not rise to greater heights. By contrast, Howland, who considers
the "whole dialogue ... primarily ... a direct and comprehensive attack on the
educational system of Isocrates," takes Plato's evaluation as expressing "the most
comprehensive damnation with the faintest possible praise" (pp. 152 and 159 of
article cited in note 8). De Vries takes Plato's evaluation as a "bitter taunt" and
"mordant sarcasm" (pp. 18 and 264 of his commentary, cited in note 15; see also
his reply to Erbse, "Isocrates in the Phaedrus: a reply," Mnemosyne 24 [1 97 1], 387-90).
Similarly, James Coulter considers the remarks an insult showing "outrageous con-
descension" {"Phaedrus 279A: The Praise of Isocrates," Greek, Roman and Byzantine
Studies 8 [1967], 225-36, p. 233).
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Socrates notes that Isocrates is "still young," but that he will venture
a prophecy. Since Isocrates has a "nobler nature" than Lysias, Socrates
says, he would not be surprised if Isocrates would with advancing
years far surpass all other rhetoricians in the type of discourse that
he is attempting "now"; and "if this is not sufficient for him, [he
would not be surprised if] some more divine impulse {opixi] dewrepa)
were to lead him to greater things, for by nature there is a certain
philosophy in the disposition of the man."^^
What is the distinction between the speeches that Isocrates is
"now" attempting and the "greater" things that he might accomplish?
I suggest that the distinction lies within the dialogue, not in any
external historical circumstances. "Now" is the present, fictional time
of the dialogue; and the type of speech that Isocrates is attempting
"now" is the kind of psychagogia that Socrates practices (on the
surface) in his first speech. Socrates praises "divine philosophy" {deioc
<t)i\o(TO<i>ia, 239b) in this speech. But this "divine" philosophy, we
learn in the recantation, has nothing divine about it. In the recantation
and dialectical examination Socrates shows what a truly "divine"
impulse is, and what truly "divine" philosophy is. The "more divine
impulse" that Socrates hypothesizes is precisely the leap from the
vulgar "philosophy" of his first speech to the genuine philosophy of
the recantation and dialectical discussion.
Socrates leaves it open whether the "young" Isocrates will take
this leap. But the reader knows that Isocrates has not taken it, since
Plato composed the dialogue when Isocrates was over sixty years
old.^^ Plato, I suggest, judged Isocrates superior to Lysias in precisely
the way that the second speech of the dialogue is superior to the
first. But this superiority, Plato indicates, is worth nothing. Indeed it
is a liability. Despite its greater orderliness and smoother rhythms,
Isocratean rhetoric is still a pseudo-rhetoric, dealing in deception;
and because it is more effective, it can do more harm. Isocratean
rhetoric holds out a promise of better things. But the promise
unfulfilled is a far greater danger than Lysianic rhetoric ever was.
The University of Chicago
^' Phaedrus 279a-b: ... en rt «' ovtw fir) airoxpvaai ravra, fVi nu^w dt tu; ocvtw ayoi
bpfiri daoripa- (l>vau yap, i <t>iX(, evtari tic, <l)iXo(TO(f>ia ry tov avdpbq biavoia.
^^ See note 17 for the date of composition. In 370 B.C. Isocrates would have been
sixty-six.
